Abstract-Collaborative applications for co-located mobile users can be severely disrupted by a sybil attack to the point of being unusable. Existing decentralized defences have largely been designed for peer-to-peer networks but not for mobile networks. That is why we propose a new decentralized defence for portable devices and call it MobID. The idea is that a device manages two small networks in which it stores information about the devices it meets: its network of friends contains honest devices, and its network of foes contains suspicious devices. By reasoning on these two networks, the device is then able to determine whether an unknown individual is carrying out a sybil attack or not. We evaluate the extent to which MobID reduces the number of interactions with sybil attackers and consequently enables collaborative applications. We do so using real mobility and social network data. We also assess computational and communication costs of MobID on mobile phones.
I. INTRODUCTION
Researchers have recently proposed general infrastructures with which portable devices in proximity of each other opportunistically trade various services with in a scalable and decentralized way [4] , [14] , [23] . Without going through any Internet server, collaborating devices are able to: synchronize their timers for playing multi-player games; run localization algorithms that increase the precision of street map software and of location-based services; cache Web content to avoid monetary costs of cellular or wireless providers; and safely exchange user ratings for mobile content-sharing applications [21] .
The problem is that collaborative applications are easily disrupted by uncooperative and malicious individuals. Those individuals profit from services without providing an adequate return and then make themselves untraceable by creating a very large number of bogus identities. In literature, those individuals are called sybil attackers or simply sybils [8] .
Existing distributed defences against sybils (discussed at length in [19] ) are largely meant to work in peer-to-peer networks. For example, SybilGuard [22] relies on social networks for identifying sybils, and SybilInfer [7] extends that approach, suffering from fewer false negatives. Few defences have been designed, however, for mobile networks. One of such mechanisms is the one proposed by Piro et al. [18] , which identifies sybils by keeping track of how identities (mobile phones) move. By observing that sybil identities are often seen together (as opposed to honest people's identities that are free to move at will), devices are able to identify a single attacker who keeps on using the same bogus identities. Still, this solution allows malicious individuals to continuously create disposable identities and go unnoticed.
We set out to fill the literature's gap by making two main contributions:
• An effective way of identifying sybil attackers for inrange portable devices (MobID). The key idea is that each device manages two small networks in which it enlists the devices it meets: its network of friends contains honest devices, and its network of foes contains suspicious devices. By reasoning on these two networks, the device is then able to determine whether an unknown individual is carrying out a sybil attack or not. MobID guarantees that honest individuals both reject bogus identities and accept honest identities, and they do so with high probability (Section II).
• Evaluation of the robustness of MobID on real mobility and social network data and of its communication and computational overhead on mobile phones (Section III).
II. OUR PROPOSAL: MOBID
MobID defends in-range portable devices against sybil attacks in a fully decentralized way. A sybil attack is one in which a malicious individual has managed to convince one or more honest people to be their friends, perhaps by social engineering. The malicious individual then introduces and controls a very large set of corrupt participants (dubbed sybils).
Problem Statement: MobID guarantees that an honest individual accepts, and is accepted by, most other honest people with high probability. The end result is that honest people successfully trade services with each other.
The end goal of MobID is not to filter out malicious individuals, but it is to limit those individuals' influence. This may translate into accepting malicious individuals but not the bogus identities they create. MobID does so under the following assumptions (most of which happen to be research findings):
Assumption 1: People have off-line relationships (have "friends") with whom they share their identities (e.g., their public keys). Mobile users may be willing to do so because, only by sharing their identities, they would then be able to trade services with each other.
Say that A has to decide whether to accept or reject B. To do so, A needs B's list of friends. So, to begin with, B sends its list of friends to A. To prevent B from lying, B's list needs to be of special form, one in which B's friends certify their relations using their private keys (known only to them). Each friend F does so by concatenating its identifier (public key) and B's identifier (e.g., P K F ||P K B ) and by then signing the result with its private key (e.g., S F (P K F ||P K B )).
B. Reasoning on a Network of Friends
Upon B's list of friends (which is anonymous and can be further obfuscated [15] ), A then decides whether to accept or reject B in three steps:
Step 1. A incorporates B's list into its network of friends. A updates its network of friends whose nodes are the identities of A's friends, A's encounters, and encounters' friends, and whose links represent the strong social connections among those identities. A connection exists between pair of individuals who trust each other not to launch a sybil attack (e.g., two friends). So links are bidirectional -they exist only between pair identities who trust each other. More concretely, consider that E and C are both friends of A, that A meets D, and that D claims to befriend E, C, and M . This situation produces the network in the top panel of Figure 1 (a). Then, if B's friends are F , H, and I, then A's updated network is that in the top panel of Figure 1 (b).
Step 2. A ranks B on its network. B's rank reflects B's importance in the network. The more central B's role in the network, the higher its rank. One common way of measuring centrality is to measure the network betweenness of B. Vertices that lie on many shortest paths between other vertices have higher betweenness that those that do not. However, such a definition assumes that information flows along shortest (ideal) paths in a network. In reality, information wanders around more randomly. That is why researchers have been introduced random-walk betweenness and have found that it performs best for several types of network (e.g., networks of Florentine families [16] , of co-authorship [13] , of sexual contacts [5] ). Importantly, to measure the betweenness of B, A starts its random walks from itself and, in so doing, it breaks "symmetry". If that would not be the case, then B could boost its rank by having its bogus identities (e.g., F , H, and I in the top panel of Figure 1 (b)) mirror the honest topology (e.g., that of A, E, C, D, and M in the same figure).
Definition:
The random-walk betweenness of B with prior A is equal to the number of times a random walk starting at A and ending at any node X passes through B, averaged over all X.
To compute B's rank and normalize it within [0, 1], we divide B's betweenness by the maximum of possible paths (i.e., by (
where n is the total number of nodes in the corresponding network.
Step 3. Depending on B's rank, A decides whether to accept or reject B. The higher B's rank, the likelier B is honest. Since sybils do not have many real friends (they are not connected to many central nodes), they sit in the periphery of the network and are rarely traversed by a random walk (they rank poorly).
That, at least, is what would happen in a large network of friends. However, portable devices store only tiny portions of the network, and B can easily boost its rank in a tiny network. To see how, take again the network in the top panel of Figure 1(b) . B may have fooled E into believing that they are friend, and it may have then fabricated the public keys F , H and I, and pretended that those keys belong to multiple individuals when, in reality, are sybils under its control. In a large network, if limited, B's list of bogus identities does not have any impact [7] , [22] . By contrast, in a small network, B's rank is boosted to the point of mistakenly accepting B. To fix this problem, we next let A reason not only on a network of friends but also on a network of suspicious individuals (which we call foes).
C. Reasoning Also on a Network of Foes
To decide whether to accept or reject B, A now carries the following three steps instead: Step 1. A incorporates B's list of friends in both of its networks. If, for example, A's two networks are those in Figure 1 (a) and B's friends are F , H, and I, then A's updated networks are those in Figure 1(b) .
Step 2. A ranks B on its two networks. Again, the rank is the number of times B is traversed by a random walk between A and any other node. The only difference is that now A produces two ranks: B's rank on the network of friends (which we call GoodRank) and B's rank on the network of foes (which we call BadRank).
Step 3. Depending on both of B's ranks, A decides whether to accept or reject B. We will see next that A takes this decision in two different ways -A either compares the two ranks in a linear way (GoodRank > l · BadRank) or clusters them with the ranks of previously encountered nodes (and, upon that comparison, it then decides whether to accept or reject B).
Again, to make the two rankings comparable, we normalize them to lie between 0 and 1, that is, we divide them by the maximum number of possible paths (i.e., ( 
D. Deciding Whether to Accept or Reject
Comparing Ranks Linearly. The simplest way to compare B's ranks is to see whether GoodRank > l · BadRank. If that is the case, then A accepts B; otherwise, it rejects B. For example, if l = 1, the dividing line is straight and defines two areas: one above the line in which nodes are rejected, and the other below the line in which nodes are accepted. If B is below the line (which means GoodRank > BadRank), then B is accepted.
However, linear comparison poses two problems: (1) one needs to arbitrarily set l; and (2) deciding who is sybil is not always clear cut. To understand the latter point, consider Figure 1(c) : the dark circles correspond to five sybils and the light circles to six honest individuals. The problem is that, by using linear comparison, one misclassifies two sybils and two honest individuals (circled in Figure 1(d) ). Clustering Ranks. To fix that problem, one should be able to group (cluster) the circles of Figure 1 (c) into two sets -"sybil set" and "honest set". The simplest and fastest clustering algorithm is K-means clustering. This algorithm generates k clusters and determines which circles belong to which cluster depending on the structure of the data. In our case, since k = 2 (we have two sets to cluster -"sybil set" and "honest set"), Kmeans clustering begins with two randomly placed centroidscircles representing the centers of the clusters (dashed empty circles of Figure 1(e) ). The clustering then assigns every circle to the nearest centroid -in the case of Figure 1(e), C, B , and G are assigned to the top centroid and M and N are assigned to the bottom centroid. After the assignment, the two centroids are moved to the average location of all nodes assigned to them (Figure 1(f) ), and the assignments are redone -it now turns out that also O is close to the bottom centroid, and F to the top one -so the two centroids accordingly move. This process repeats until the assignments stop changing. The final result is that L, M , N , O and P are in one cluster (sybil), Importantly, for either way of comparing ranks, by creating bogus identities, B does not gain anything. That is because if B creates bogus identities, then it would artificially boost not only its GoodRank but also its BadRank.
and B, C, D, E, F , and G in the other (honest). A cluster is considered sybil (honest) if the majority of its circles are sybil (honest). The clustering for B is done only if B's GoodRank and
However, one may rightly say that, even if B is honest, it would be rejected if it is unknown to either A, A's friends, or A's encounters. In Section III, we will see that the extent to which honest people are mistakenly rejected is very limited. That is because honest people tend to have social connections with other honest people. So, if B's friend H is honest, then it would likely link to at least one of the node in A's network; for example, to D. The result would be that A adds D − H in its network of friends and, because of that, B's GoodRank increases -B will be traversed by random walks more often.
Also, networks of foes help to detect colluding attackers. To see why, consider that F and X (B's and Y 's sybil identities) collude and claim to befriend each other (bottom panel of Figure 1(b) ). That results into an additional link X − F in the network of foes, and that link increases the probability that B and Y are traversed by random walks -that is, it increases both B's and Y 's BadRanks. 
E. Updating the Two Networks
At this point, B and its friends are still stored in A's networks, but that network needs to be updated depending on whether B has been accepted or rejected. A does so by removing B and its friends from its network of foes, if A accepts B; or from its network of friends, if A rejects B. This results into a network of friends that contains people who have been accepted (plus their friends) and into a network of foes that contains people who have been rejected (plus their friends).
This way of updating the two networks is reasonable but may fail at times. More specifically, it may: (1) enlist honest people in the network of foes, but those people are then removed from that network when their friends will be part of the network of friends; (2) enlist sybils in the network of friends, but this is unlikely given their marginal position in the network of friends.
III. EVALUATION
The goal of MobID is to both reject sybils and accept honest people. To ascertain the effectiveness of MobID at meeting this goal, our evaluation ought to answer the following questions: How effectively does MobID protect against sybils? More specifically, does MobID fail to detect some sybils (does it suffer from false negatives)? What is the fraction of honest individuals (mistakenly) considered sybils (fraction of false positives)? What time, storage, and communication overhead does MobID impose on a mobile phone?
To answer those questions, we set up simulations driven by real data (empirical observations) about how individuals move and when they interact. Then, while running our simulations, we evaluate the robustness of MobID by keeping track of: (1) The fraction f of fulfilled sybil interactions (i.e., interactions that have been fulfilled by Sybils over those attempted); and (2) The fraction m of missed interactions (i.e., interactions mistakenly refused over those attempted by honest people). By doing so, we assess to what extent MobID reduces both f and m. Simulation Setup. The setup of our simulations is based on observations about: (1) How people move. We use data about how 96 people moved while carrying their mobile phones for 9 months and about who those people befriend (Reality Mining project [9] ); (2) When those people interact. We considered that any two individuals interact if they share content categories. We assign content categories to individuals in two ways: random and realistic. By realistic, we mean that we distribute interests so that: (1) friends share more categories than unknown individuals do; (2) category popularity follows a Zipf distribution. Below we will show the results for the realistic distribution. For the random distribution, the results are slightly better but the difference is negligible.
Then, similarly to Danezis et al.'s evaluation [6] , we introduce 100 new people (sybils) who infiltrate 1%, 20%, 30%, . . . , 90% of the Reality Mining social network. By infiltrating, we mean the ability of attackers to have real social connections in the social network. So "100 sybils infiltrate 20% of the network" means that "19 real individuals (20% of the network) turn to be attackers and control the remaining 81 sybil identities". Each sybil uses any of its bogus identity with equal probability. Reducing (vulnerability) f . One would expect that the fraction of interactions that sybils fulfill (f ) mainly depends on how diffusively sybils infiltrate the social network. Figure 2 (a) plots f against sybils' infiltration rate for three situations: 1. Network of friends. Attackers declare only their affiliation with the honest people they have managed to fool. They do so in the attempt to camouflage affiliation with any bogus identity. On the other hand, to defend themselves, mobile users employ only networks of friends (no network of foes). This setting shows how well existing solutions based on social networks would do in the best case. 2. MobID linear. Attackers infiltrate the community and, to defend themselves, mobile users compare two rankings (one from the network of friends, and the other from the network of foes), and they do so linearly using the three coefficients l = { 1 2 , 1, 2}.
MobID clustering.
This situation is the same as the previous point except for the way the two rankings are compared, which now relies on K-means clustering.
As one expects, Figure 2 (a) shows that f increases with the attackers' infiltration rate for the three strategies. For MobID linear, the best linear coefficient l is 2. That is because, by increasing l, one conservatively reduces the acceptance area (the dividing line goes down) and consequently is less exposed to attackers (lower f ). Overall, MobID clustering performs best. For example, if 20% of people in the community turn to be attackers, against MobID clustering, those attackers only manage to fulfill less than 1% of the interactions that would have happened if no protection had been in place. Also, the way the two remaining strategies perform suggests that it pays to reason not only on a network of friends but also on a network of foes -all the more so if one uses K-means clustering instead of linear comparison. Reducing (lost opportunities) m. Since they are unable to distinguish between completely unknown individuals and sybils, defence strategies may mistakenly reject honest people. Now the question is to which extent they do so. By plotting the fraction of missed interactions with honest people in Figure 2 (b), we observe that, up to a 60% infiltration rate, each of the three strategies shows a flat fraction of missed interactions: MobID clustering is approximately flat at 30% of missed interactions, network of friends at 35%, and MobID linear at 40% (with l = 1 2 ). Predictably, for MobID linear, the best coefficient is l = 1 2 . That is because, by decreasing l, one increases the acceptance area (the dividing line goes up), openly accepts more people, and consequently suffers little from lost opportunities (lower m). If attackers manage to diffusely infiltrate the community (more than 70% of its members), most honest people are abruptly excluded from the system. That is because their networks become extremely sparse and they are unable to identify sybils. These results are in line with research on complex systems, which shows that phase transitions tend to describe the robustness of social networks, in that, after a critical point, networks abruptly break [1] . Once again, MobID clustering proves to be the most effective strategy -for high attacker infiltration rate (up to 60%), it rejects 35% of the interactions, which happen to come from 17% of community members. This result improves on existing approaches. However, to avoid the social exclusion of that 17% of the community, one should integrate MobID with other mechanisms (e.g., trust negotiation [10] , trust propagation [20] ). Overhead. We detailed MobID's overhead in [19] and summarize it here. As for MobID: (1) it exchanges a list of t trusted friends; if, say, a list contains 100 friends, then the list can be transmitted in less than one second with Bluetooth; (2) it performs random walks on small networks and, being those networks small, it does so with limited computation; (3) it runs K-means clustering, which is the fastest clustering algorithm; and (4) it safely manages the list of friends using public key encryptions, which are acceptable on mobile phones and can be made faster if implemented in hardware.
IV. CONCLUSION
MobID is a protection mechanism that makes in-range portable devices resilient to sybil attackers with high probability. These attackers disrupt sharing communities and then make themselves untraceable by producing bogus identities. MobID relies on the fact that attackers may create many bogus identities but few real-life relationships. Using real mobility and social network data, we have validated that the version of MobID that uses K-means clustering performs best -for example, it protects against attackers who infiltrate 20% of a real mobile community without causing any disruption. MobID also scales -it entails reasonable storage, communication, and computational overhead. To further evaluate MobID, we are studying how a large number of mobile phone users happen to be co-located and how their mobility patterns can be overlayed with synthetic social networks.
